| croomvswan | Bryan Croom v. Joseph Swan for John Oliver | Text | Trial and arbitral proceedings--Florida
Liability (Law) -- Florida. | /fpc/memory/omeka_images/thumbnails/supreme_court.jpg |
Bryan Croom v. Joseph Swan for John Oliver
- Date
- 1845
- Description
- John Oliver was employed as an overseer on Bryan Croom's Gadsden County plantation at Rocky Comfort. In January of 1838, Oliver, acting as an agent for Croom, sold one of Croom's horses to Captain John Shaw of the 5th Regiment of the Florida Militia Volunteers. Oliver had guaranteed the horse was sound, and Shaw rode it out on an expedition against the Seminoles the same day that he purchased it.
Unfortunately, the horse proved to be unsound. According to a witness, Shaw had to abandon the use of the horse within a day or two after the company left Quincy, and the horse remained idle. Shaw sued Oliver for false warranty to recover the $150.00 he paid, plus damages. But by May of 1838 Oliver had died, and the suit succeeded against his estate, which was being administered by Joseph Swann.
Swann attempted to recover the money for the estate from Croom. In the Territorial Superior Court for Leon County, Swann offered as evidence the depositions of witnesses showing that Oliver was in the employ of Croom at the time he sold the horse, and that he was authorized by Croom to sell; that Croom had received the proceeds of the sale; and that Croom had said that Swann would have to refund to Shaw, but he was the proper person to lose the money, if any one did.
Croom's attorney in the lower court, Thomas Baltzell, moved that the record was not sufficient evidence of alleged warranty by Oliver, or evidence of any authority by Croom to Oliver to make such warranty. The court refused the motions, and the jury returned a verdict for Swann. Croom then appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. By the time of the appeal, Baltzell had become a Justice of the Supreme Court and recused himself from sitting on this case.
The Court found for Croom and reversed the judgment of the lower court. It decided that an agent cannot maintain an action against his principal (in this case, Croom) to recover the amount paid by him on a judgment obtained against him for a false warranty, without showing that he was authorized by his principal to make the warrant.
Also, the Court found that the record of the judgment was not evidence of authority from the principal to the agent to warrant. The receipt by Croom of the proceeds of the sale of the horse, sold by Oliver, was not evidence of authority to Oliver to warrant, nor was it a ratification of the warranty, since there was no evidence to show that at the time of receiving the proceeds he knew that a warranty had been given by the agent.
Finally, the Court decided that when an agent makes a false warranty, the principal is liable to the purchaser and not to the agent, unless he can show that a deception has been practiced on him by his principal, and that in pursuance of orders or instructions, he bona fide made the false representations, and is compelled to pay damages to the purchaser. Croom would have been liable to Captain Shaw, but not to his agent.
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| bradiervyulee | David L. Yulee v. Francis Bradier | Text | Trial and arbitral proceedings--Florida
Claims against decedents' estates
Probate law and practice--Florida | /fpc/memory/omeka_images/thumbnails/supreme_court.jpg |
David L. Yulee v. Francis Bradier
- Date
- 1861
- Description
- In 1861, the Florida Supreme Court considered the case of David L. Yulee v. Francis Bridier.
This case involved the attempt of one party, Francis Bridier, to "set up a certain paper writing, purporting to have been executed by Susan Murphy, deceased, and to establish the same as her last will and testament." David L. Yulee challenged the will, based on "want of mental capacity, and undue influence." Unfortunately, there are no other details with which to establish the basis for Yulee's claims.
In St. Johns County Circuit Court, the jury found the will held by Bridier to be "invalid and of no effect." Bridier pursued an appeal before the Florida Supreme Court based on charges that the circuit court had acted improperly during the trial.
One of the points of contention was the admission of testimony from a "Miss Striska." Striska apparently knew Murphy and was party to an earlier or alternate version of her will. In some circumstances this would have rendered her testimony inadmissible. However, the court found that since her testimony was corroborated by other witnesses her remarks did not mislead the jury.
The high court upheld the verdict rendered by the lower court and found in favor of Yulee.
What is most interesting about this case is the involvement of David L. Yulee, who was elected as Florida's first United States Senator in 1845 (also the first Jewish member of the U.S. Senate). Prior to that time he had practiced law in St. Augustine, served as a territorial representative to Congress, and was a delegate to the Florida constitutional convention of 1838.
Yulee owned a large sugar plantation on the Homosassa River north of Tampa and also invested in railroads. During the Civil War he served in the Confederate Congress, which after 1865 resulted in a nine-month imprisonment at Fort Pulaski in Georgia.
After his imprisonment, Yulee returned to Florida and again invested in railroads. He is credited with spurring the economic development of northeast Florida after the Civil War.
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| bradfordvcole | Edward Bradford v. A.S. Cole | Text | Eminent domain--Florida.
Real property law and legislation | /fpc/memory/omeka_images/thumbnails/supreme_court.jpg |
Edward Bradford v. A.S. Cole
- Date
- 1859
- Description
- In 1859, the Florida Supreme Court considered the case of Edward Bradford v. A.S. Cole. This case came to the high court on appeal from the Leon County Circuit Court.
This case involved a petition submitted by A.S. Cole on behalf of 20 or so members of a neighborhood for the construction of a road through land owned by Edward Bradford. The petition read, in part, "whether or not the said Bradford would be damaged more by the road being opened or the community by its being closed."
Cole, a practicing physician, was primarily interested in using the road for better access to his patients. He complained about having to travel five miles out of the way, a problem that he claimed could be solved by opening to the public the road through Bradford's land.
In this instance, the road referred to was already in place as a path; the petitioners wanted it improved and maintained as a public or "neighborhood" road. Its current status and route through Bradford's land meant he could restrict access.
The Commissioners of Leon County sent three individuals out to the property to survey the existing route and determine the potential for improvements. The surveyors found that the road would greatly benefit the residents of the area by providing a more direct route into Tallahassee.
Based on these findings, the lower court ruled in favor of Cole and the other petitioners. Bradford then pursued an appeal before the Florida Supreme Court.
The high court disagreed with the lower court. According to their reading of cases which established precedent for eminent domain, the petitioners did not demonstrate that the road was a matter of necessity, but rather that it would simply be more convenient than the current route. The Supreme Court was not prepared to intervene on behalf of Leon County and exercise eminent domain over Bradford's lands. To the court, it appeared that Cole's problem was more of a personal matter than a public concern.
The opinion of the court in this case warrants quoting at length: "...if mere individual benefit, profit, convenience or advantage is to operate in grants of this kind, where is it to end? The merchant, mechanic, millman, planter, will alike have interests to subserve [sic] by having roads to his house, store or workshop, and the whole country be cut up by private roads. Take away the private inconvenience to [Cole] and there is no excuse nor pretence [sic] for the road, and if [Cole] leaves or removes from the neighborhood, there would seem to be no use for the road."
This case demonstrates the reluctance of the court to take a liberal interpretation of eminent domain. It is not clear whether Bradford's status as a prominent planter and landowner weighed on the court's decision. It is easy to imagine that plantation owners would have banded together to oppose any attempts to bisect their large estates with public thoroughfares.
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| fatiovdewees | Fatio v. Dewees | Text | Trial and arbitral proceedings--Florida.
Land grants--Florida -- St Johns County. | /fpc/memory/omeka_images/thumbnails/supreme_court.jpg |
Fatio v. Dewees
- Date
- 1838
- Description
- In 1838, the Florida Territorial Court of Appeals considered the case of Francis P. Fatio v. Philip Dewees. The case, which originated in the St. Johns Circuit Court, involved a complex legal battle over land held by the Dewees family since the 1790s.
Both parties in this case represented families with established roots in Florida. The Francis P. Fatio named in this case was the son of Francis P. Fatio Sr. The elder Fatio originally came to East Florida from Switzerland during the British period (1763-1783). He acquired plantations and slaves and became involved in the colonial government. Fatio remained in Florida following the retrocession of Florida to Spain in 1783. In the first decade of the 19th century, Seminole warriors raided Fatio's property and carried off slaves on more than one occasion. Because of his tenure in Florida and his political connections, Fatio ranked among the largest land owners when, in 1821, the territory became part of the United States.
Andrew Dewees, Philip's father, came to Florida from South Carolina in the 1790s and received a grant of land from the Spanish government. Offering land grants to prospective settlers was the primary means by which the Spanish sought to populate the Florida frontier. The Spaniards hoped to create a buffer of plantations to squeeze as much profit as possible from the land in Florida. These plantations might also have served as an impediment to the expansionist Americans as well as the Creeks and Seminoles who controlled Florida's interior into the early 19th century.
This case involved a dispute over property along the St. Johns River included in the Spanish grant to Andrew Dewees. In 1831, Francis P. Fatio the younger sued the heirs of Dewees in the Florida Territorial Court of Appeals in order to reverse a ruling made by the Eastern District (St. Johns) of that judicial body.
The case hinged on the legality of a sale made by Catalina, wife of Andrew Dewees, to the firm of John Forbes & Company in 1811, after her husband's death in 1794. Under the terms of the will of Andrew Dewees, Catalina received title to half of the lands included in the estate. The other half of the estate went to the children of Andrew Dewees and their heirs.
The heirs of Dewees filed, successfully, an action of ejectment against Francis P. Fatio who had leased a portion of the land in question from John Forbes & Company. To substantiate their claims, the heirs of Philip Dewees produced documents confirming the original Royal Title, certified and dated May 4, 1804, as well as records relating to the estate of Andrew Dewees and the subsequent sale of lands therein to Forbes.
After seven years of appeals and retrials, the jury determined to award the land to the heirs of Andrew Dewees based on the evidence that the transaction between Forbes & Company and Catherine Dewees did not include the children's portion of the estate as stipulated in the will. About 1,800 acres of land reverted back to the heirs of Dewees and Fatio was evicted from the land.
This case is an example of the complexities of the law as it related to property, especially real estate claimed prior to the acquisition of Florida by the United States. Learn more about lands held by the Fatio and Dewees families in the Spanish Land Grants Collection.
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| forbesvapalachicola | Forbes v. Apalachicola Land Company | Text | Trial and arbitral proceedings -- Florida
Remainders (Estates) -- Florida. | /fpc/memory/omeka_images/thumbnails/supreme_court.jpg |
Forbes v. Apalachicola Land Company
- Date
- 1853
- Description
- This case, Forbes v. Apalachicola Land Company, is one component of a larger, prolonged series of legal disputes over what is known as the Forbes Purchase.
Between 1804 and 1811, representatives of the Creeks and Seminoles ceded approximately 1.2 million acres of land to the firm of John Forbes & Company. The land cession, located between the Apalachicola and St. Marks Rivers, atoned for long-standing debts incurred by the Creeks and Seminoles with Panton, Leslie & Company and its successor Forbes & Company.
By virtue of an agreement with the Spanish government, Panton, Leslie (and then Forbes) & Company exercised a monopoly over the Indian trade in Florida during the second Spanish period. The Indian trade in Florida consisted primarily of the Creeks and Seminoles exchanging animal hides and other commodities for guns, ammunition, cloth, metal tools, and other items they could not produce themselves. The nature of this business tended to enrich Euro-American merchants at the expense of Native American communities, who quickly became indebted to and dependent upon firms such as Forbes & Company.
In 1817, Colin Mitchel acquired the Forbes Purchase. Mitchel and others then formed the Apalachicola Land Company to survey, subdivide, and sell the land to settlers. The legality of the Forbes Purchase and subsequent transfer to Mitchel became the subject of intense scrutiny when Spain ceded Florida to the United States in 1821.
By 1835, the U.S. Congress had determined the Forbes Purchase to be legal. However, this did not settle the many questions surrounding the boundaries of the land, the contesting claims filed before the Florida and United States land commissions, and the practice of squatters taking up residence on the vast, undeveloped tract.
The documents included here deal primarily with claims made by descendants of Thomas Forbes. The heirs of Forbes, particularly John G. Forbes, felt defrauded by their uncle (John Forbes the elder) following the sale to Mitchel and others. The case file includes rich detail about the state of the Forbes family a few decades removed from their prominent position in Florida's Indian trade as well as information about Spanish settlers on the Forbes tract and various brief accounts on the circumstances of the purchase.
Due to the Seminole Wars, the Civil War, and other extenuating circumstances, aspects of the Forbes Purchase controversy remained unresolved into the early 20th century. As with many other aspects of the lengthy legal battles over the Forbes Purchase, more research is needed to determine how these documents fit into the story and broaden our understanding of Native American land cessions along the southern frontier.
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| mcleoddellvdelldell | Fredrick Mcleod & Amos L. Dell v. Philip Dell & W.M. Dell | Text | Trial and arbitral proceedings--Florida
Remainders (Estates) -- Florida. | /fpc/memory/omeka_images/thumbnails/supreme_court.jpg |
Fredrick Mcleod & Amos L. Dell v. Philip Dell & W.M. Dell
- Date
- 1861
- Description
- In 1861, the Florida Supreme Court considered the case of Ferdinand McLeod and Amos Dell v. Phillip Dell and Bennett Dell.
This case involved the settlement of two separate but interrelated estates; the first, that of Bennett Dell, family patriarch, and the second, that of his son Amos Dell.
Bennett Dell's last will and testament provides insight into the property that a wealthy Florida planter might have owned before the Civil War. Bennett willed to his wife, Eliza Dorothy, control of the plantation known as "Standby," located near Newnansville in Alachua County. Eliza was also entitled to receive five horses, a carriage, farming tools, one hundred head of cattle, numerous hogs, household goods, furniture, and 18 slaves (named individually in the case documents).
However, if Eliza remarried, this property would revert to her children with Bennett, and thereafter to any grandchildren. Bennett also specified that $1,000 should be given in Eliza's name to the Methodist Episcopal Church she chose to attend. The specific exception to executing this provision read: "but under no circumstances [should this money] be paid to any [preacher] raised North of Mason and Dixon's Line, or tinctured with Abolitionism in the least degree."
Bennett's will then outlined the bequest to his children with Eliza. Sarah Angelina was entitled to seven slaves; the children of Charles L., who had died in Texas, would receive money, placed in trust, upon their 21st birthdays; Mary S., who lived in Texas, would receive money only in the event that her husband died; Amos' inheritance would likewise be placed in trust. Two other sons, John and Philip, are listed as executors of the estate, along with their mother. John would become executor upon reaching 21 years of age.
All other property not specified was to be divided among the children of Bennett and Eliza, and then to the grandchildren upon their deaths. One final provision required a delay on the sale of land known as the "Garey Tract" near Paine's [Paynes] Prairie until it reached the price of $25 per acre.
Bennett died shortly after the creation of his last will and testament. Amos then followed his father in death, apparently soon after. Amos died intestate, without a will. He had appointed Ferdinand McLeod as executor of his estate, but without a will to specifically outline the settlement of the estate. Amos was married to Mary E. and they had one son, an infant at the time of his father's death.
The dispute in this case revolved around the property held by Amos at the time of this death. What was part of his father's estate? Did this include five slaves known to have at one time been the property of Bennett the elder? According to Bennett's will, the property should, upon the death of Amos, pass on to his children, in this case the infant son.
The case then turned to the meaning of the terms "children" and "their children" in the will of Bennett. Did Bennett intend these terms to be the manner of succession, as in "their children" would receive the inheritance only if Bennett and Eliza's children were deceased? Or, did Bennett intend "their children" to be a substitute for "children?"
After a protracted debate over the meaning of these two terms and other language in the will, the court decided that the best course of action was to place in trust the property of Amos Dell, including the five slaves in question, for the future benefit of his infant son.
More on the settlement of the estate of Bennett and related Dells can be found in a second case heard in 1861, Ferdinand McLeod and Amos L. Dell v. Philip Dell and William Dell.
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| summerlinevtyler | Jacob Summerlin v. S.S. Tyler and Wife | Text | Trial and arbitral proceedings--Florida
Debt | /fpc/memory/omeka_images/thumbnails/supreme_court.jpg |
Jacob Summerlin v. S.S. Tyler and Wife
- Date
- 1856
- Description
- In 1856, the Florida Supreme Court considered the case of Jacob Summerlin vs. Simeon S. Tyler and Wife.
In 1854, Simeon and Margaret Tyler rented a home on Forsythe Street in Jacksonville to Jacob Summerlin. According to the court documents, the rent was set at $120 per year to be paid in advance.
Summerlin, known as the "King of the Crackers" for his connection with Florida's 19th century cattle industry, apparently failed to deliver the rent, or sought to break the agreement prior to the term outlined in the lease. As a result, the Tylers sued Summerlin in order to recover $30 he owed the couple. Unfortunately, the case documents do not specify why Summerlin rented the house or the nature of his conflict over payments with the Tylers.
The Duval County Justice of the Peace assigned to the case ruled against Summerlin. Court documents allude to a survey of property owned by Summerlin, possibly in order to sell to satisfy the debt. References are made to a horse, and in another instance a "sorrel mare" valued at $75, as among the property held by Summerlin.
Summerlin, who claimed to have a receipt of payment, pursued an appeal. His appeal was rejected because "more than three days had elapsed from the trial of the case and the signing and approval of the appeal bond." Lawyers for Summerlin were able to show that the lower court had acted improperly, because, in fact, the three-day deadline referred to the adjournment of the Justices' Court rather than the date of the judgment in trial. The lower court was then ordered to reinstate the appeal.
It is unclear what happened next. Presumably the lower court heard Summerlin's appeal, but the outcome is unknown.
This case suggests a possibility for further research on Jacob Summerlin's business and personal activities in and around the Jacksonville area before the Civil War. He was certainly active in the cattle business at the time of this trial, and remained prominent throughout the war as a blockade runner.
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| seamenvforester | John E. Seamen et. al v. Schooner Forester and Cargo | Text | Trial and arbitral proceedings--Florida
Maritime law -- Florida.
Salvage -- Florida. | /fpc/memory/omeka_images/thumbnails/supreme_court.jpg |
John E. Seamen et. al v. Schooner Forester and Cargo
- Date
- 1839
- Description
- With its long coastline, numerous bays, inlets, and treacherous reefs, Florida presented unique problems for the creation and enforcement of maritime law.
In 1839, the Franklin Circuit Court of the Superior Court for Middle Florida, located at Apalachicola, considered the case John E. Seaman, et al. v. Schooner Forester.
This case highlighted the many perils faced by oceangoing vessels as they plied Florida's waters. In September 1838, the schooner Forester, bound for New Orleans via Apalachicola and Mobile, ran aground off the west end of St. George Island. The schooner Orleans, at the port of Apalachicola for repairs, responded and began saving the crew, passengers, and cargo of the Forester.
During the operations, the Orleans suffered additional damages as it struck the shallow seafloor and bounced off the stranded Forester. These injuries further weakened the Orleans, necessitating continuous pumping by the ship's crew to prevent it too from sinking beneath the waves. Over the course of several days, the crew of the Orleans succeeded in lightening the Forester and freeing it from the reef. Because of high seas, the salvagers quickly turned to loading smaller vessels rather than further risk the Orleans. Finally, once all the cargo was offloaded, the battered vessels returned to the nearby port of Apalachicola to assess the damage.
The crew of the Orleans, led by its Master and part-owner John E. Seaman, sought compensation for their heroic efforts to prevent the loss of life and cargo from the Forester. Because the Orleans was not regularly employed in wrecking, it appears that the intervention of the court was necessary to secure payment for services rendered. Also, apparently the insurance policy on the Orleans covered the vessel only in the waters of Apalachicola Bay and did not extend to the reefs offshore St. George Island. Seaman and his crew argued before the court that they had little choice but to act quickly to save the Forester as no other capable vessel was in port at the time.
Citing the customary practice of compensating wreckers and salvagers, the crew of the Orleans sought wages to the tune of $2 per day as well as funds to assist in repairing their vessel. Seaman for his part demanded $5 per day. According to documents included with the case, six men from the Orleans had aided the distressed Forester.
In order to determine the payment due to Seaman and the crew of the Orleans, appraisers had to assess the value of the Forester and its cargo. The initial appraisals met resistance from both parties. Their objections rested on the belief that the appraisers were not well enough acquainted with the business of shipping to properly assess the value of the Forester and its cargo. Another problem arose from the fact that some cargo, specifically about 150 sacks of salt, were thrown overboard to lighten the ship. Representatives on both sides grew impatient with the pace of the proceedings, as with every day the perishable cargo risked becoming worthless.
The court ordered the sale of goods salvaged from the Forester at a public auction. The crew of the Orleans was to be paid one-third of the amount collected as well as one-fourth of the court costs they incurred. It appears that at this point in the trial representatives for the Forester filed an appeal, the results of which are unknown.
As with other cases involving wrecking and salvaging, this case documents the complexities of maritime law and the dangers faced by shipping interests in the Gulf of Mexico. What is different about the Forester case is that its rescuers were pressed into service, rather than being regular wreckers. Their valiant efforts to save the crew, passengers, and cargo may have netted them an eventual reward, but at the expense of their own ship and a considerable amount of their time.
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| millercroomvshoc | John Miller & Bryan Croom v. Fredrick & Lewis Hoc | Text | Trial and arbitral proceedings -- Florida | /fpc/memory/omeka_images/thumbnails/supreme_court.jpg |
John Miller & Bryan Croom v. Fredrick & Lewis Hoc
- Date
- 1847
- Description
- In 1847, the Florida Supreme Court considered the case of John Miller and Bryan Croom vs. Frederic and Louis Hoc. This case came to the high court as an appeal from the Superior Court of the former Territory of Florida.
In 1841, the brothers Frederic and Louis Hoc, French settlers and sons of Tallahassee grocer Louis Hoc, sued local planters John Miller and Bryan Croom for debt on an attachment bond in the Superior Court of Leon County.
The attachment or property levied may have been building materials, as an 1845 filing by their attorney referred to newly discovered evidence that the plaintiffs retained possession of the property levied on and with the burned brick, built a house or a part thereof, and used or sold the others.
Miller and Croom filed pleas denying the debt action in December. In February of 1842, a judgment by default was entered against Miller and Croom, despite the fact that they had filed pleas.
Later in 1842 the Hoc brothers filed their reply for damages. There was a second case between the parties that was in all respects similar to this, and in March 1845, the two cases, by consent of both parties, were submitted together to a jury. The jury found for the Hoc brothers and assessed the damages at $1,500, which included both cases.
A few days later on motion of the Hocs, the jury empanelled in the case was recalled into Court for the purpose of apportioning the damages returned by them in their verdict between the two cases. Miller and Croom filed a bill of exceptions about the case, which was refused because the jury was called together only to specify the verdict already found. They lost the case and appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida. By this time, the parties in the case had been reduced to Miller and Croom versus Frederic Hoc, as his brother Louis had committed suicide in June of 1846.
The Supreme Court found that the lower court had erred in pronouncing a judgment by default, when the record showed that pleas by the defendant had in fact been entered. The Court also decided that separate and independent verdicts should have been rendered in each case, as opposed to a combined verdict. And finally, that the jury should not have been reconvened when there was no new issue to try. The judgment was reversed and sent back to the lower court for further proceedings.
Summary of the ruling, as published in Florida Reports, Volume 1 (1847):
"Where the record shows that a judgment by default, for want of a plea was entered, when in fact a plea had been filed and appeared upon the record, the court will conclude that the plea was overlooked, and that judgment was entered through inadvertence.
"When two distinct cases between the same parties, are by consent, submitted at the same time to the same jury, the jury should return a separate verdict in each case.
"And in such case the jury should assess the damages, not pro rata [proportionately], but according to the evidence in each case, independent of the other.
"Upon failure to rejoin to the replication to a plea of non damnificatus [the defendant's plea that the plaintiff has not been damaged], there is no issue which can be submitted to a jury, and the defect is not cured by a verdict."
"A jury, after having rendered their verdict on Saturday and been discharged, cannot be recalled on the ensuing Wednesday for the purpose of putting their verdict in form, and apportioning the damages in each of the two cases which had been by consent submitted to them."
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| johnsonvarmistead | Johnson v. Armistead | Text | Trial and arbitral proceedings--Florida
Estates--Florida
Estates--Virginia | /fpc/memory/omeka_images/thumbnails/supreme_court.jpg |
Johnson v. Armistead
- Date
- 1834
- Description
- It is not entirely clear how this case, which is principally concerned with affairs in Virginia, ended up in the files of the Florida Supreme Court. Further research on the principal parties involved is needed to fully explore the Florida connection.
John Armistead died sometime prior to 1834. Armistead's large estate included lands in Virginia and Florida, homes, tools, commodities, and slaves. His will divided the estate between his widow and their three children, including Adelia H. Johnson. Before the estate was settled, Adelia died intestate (without a will). The court determined that her share of the estate would revert to her young son, John Evans Johnson. Her husband, William A. Johnson, represented John, referred to as an infant under 21 years of age throughout the case documents.
In order to account for young John's portion of the estate, it had to be determined with exact details what property remained in the estate. The majority of the documents in this case file consist of an accounting of lands, debts, credits, and various economic activities related to the estate of John Armistead. The value of this case for researchers is in the details contained in the list of property attributed to the estate of John Armistead, a wealthy Virginia planter.
Marcus Armistead administered the estate of John Armistead and agreed to ensure the timely and proper transfer of inheritance to the young John Evans Johnson. Like many other landed elites, the Virginians Latimus and Marcus Armistead came to Florida in search of economic opportunity. They established a trading firm on the Lower Chattahoochee River and later conducted substantial business in Jackson County, Florida. Other members of the Armistead family, including John Armistead, had acquired lands in Jefferson County, Florida by the time of this trial. It is possible that the Armisteads living in Florida requested copies of this document for their own legal purposes, and that the documents later ended up in the files of the Florida Supreme Court.
This case serves to illustrate the economic connections between Florida and other southern states in the 1830s. It also provides a glimpse into the operation of an antebellum Virginia plantation.
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